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Abstract  
This paper focuses on how livelihood and the question of development and environment in a 
globalising era should be examined. It discusses various views in geography on the question 
of environment and development, and it explores the concept of sustainable livelihood. It 
concludes that a geographical conceptualisation of “development and environment” may 
profit from the discussion on sustainable livelihood, provided that it does not become 
entangled in an actor-cum-local bias. Moreover, the diffusion of non-equilibrium concepts 
may broaden the analysis of man-land relations and open the way to an analysis of 
globalisation effects. Globalisation gives rise to new assortments of geographical entities and, 
as livelihoods adapt, they will shape constantly shifting regions with specific man-land 
arrangements. 
 
Introduction 
 
Development and environment have long been considered to be contradictory. Until the 
beginning of the 1990s, development, which was confined most of the time to increased 
income generation i.e. economic growth, was generally perceived as being inevitably 
detrimental to the environment. Paradoxically, poverty was also considered as a main cause of 
environmental degradation. It was usually accepted that economic growth in developing 
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countries would have negative effects on the environment. However, this seemed to be a fair 
trade-off in the fight to alleviate poverty. At that time, only a few geographers maintained that 
development and environment were compatible. 
However, at the turn of the millennium, an optimistic view of the compatibility of 
development and environment has become fashionable. A limited number of, mainly African, 
case studies have provided evidence for this. Their results are now being generalised and, 
moreover, linked with another fashionable geographical concept, i.e. livelihood, because of 
the latter’s potential for integrating the environmental issue into the poverty alleviation 
debate. However, “sustainable livelihood” as it is now called, is biased towards the locality. I 
will argue that livelihood and, in a broader sense, the issue of development and environment 
in geography, should be reexamined in the context of globalisation.  
In the first sections, this paper discusses various views of geographers on the question of 
environment and development, illustrated with examples from environmental studies in 
Africa. It then explores the concept of sustainable livelihood. Finally, it focuses on 
globalisation and proposes how livelihood and the question of development and environment 
should be examined in a globalising era. 
 
Development and environment: received wisdom in geography 
 
Development is often interpreted in a narrow sense as “economic growth” and statistically 
based on only one criterion, i.e. GNP per capita. Since 1990, the United Nations Development 
Program has been trying to do justice to the view that development is not only a matter of 
income or a decent standard of living, but also of welfare. Its “Human Development Index” 
includes, in addition to income, longevity and knowledge. In the same vein, the United 
Nations Environmental Programme is paying attention to the sustainability of development 
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and proposing to use indicators of development that include depletion of resources, pollution 
etc. However, these views on development are far from being generally accepted. In this 
section and the next, we shall review the geographical debate on the environment and 
development. It will become clear that disagreements are not always as fundamental as they 
are said to be, although labelling the debate as “putting old wine into new bottles” is going 
too far. 
 
The link between development and environment has been discussed in geography in various 
ways. A postmodernist would maintain that the identification of tensions or even 
incompatibility depends on the author’s political or ideological agenda, and on his or her 
social position. Even in the down-to-earth geography of development, postmodern insights 
from sociology and anthropology are now generally being accepted. Knowledge, and not only 
the indigenous knowledge of the African peasant, but scientific knowledge too, is considered 
to be a social construct and therefore negotiable. All knowledge is thus changeable and 
nothing is universal. Science is a way of reducing reality and, in the worst case, discrepancies 
are smoothed over, resulting in scientific myths or narratives.  It is this new routine of 
understanding that has resulted in the stereotyping of certain accepted insights as “received 
wisdom.” Criticising these accepted insights by developing new propositions is then called 
“challenging received wisdom”. The danger here is that challenging received wisdom results 
eventually in a new myth, or rather, a “counter-narrative”. 
To sum up, following Blaikie (1995), scientific truth is seen to be socially negotiated, rather 
than universal and invariably reproduced under the same experimental conditions and 
assumptions, irrespective of who carries them out. Different people, scientists and non-
scientists alike, may claim different truths about the environment.  
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For a sober geographer, this may sound a bit exuberant. If this means that every geographer 
has his or her own truth about the link between development and environment, then it comes 
quite near to reading maps in the dark (Blaikie and De Haan 1998). Fortunately, some help is 
at hand. Looking into the rise of the modern environmental movement, Turner (1988, p.1) 
made a distinction into three world views, which he could also have called ideologies, 
underlying different sections in the movement, viz. a preservationist, an exploitationist and a 
conservationist view. These tendencies are, of course, not mutually exclusive. However, one 
could say with a wink at postmodernity, that the trick is first to construct a “myth” or 
“orthodoxy” and then to pin it on your opponents. This makes it a lot easier to criticise them, 
although the risk of only creating a “counter-narrative” is apparent. 
 
Preservationism is a type of ecocentrism which aims to preserve as much nature - tropical 
forests, whales - thus biodiversity, as possible. Preservationists want to prevent species from 
disappearing, because the extinction of species will eventually result in the extinction of man 
as top of the food chain. The most extreme position, called by Turner (1988, p.1) “deep 
ecology”, even awards intrinsic value to nature and rights to non-humans. Consequently, in 
this view, wildlife should be protected against poachers by the death penalty and  settlers 
should be chased from the tropical forest. In geography, this view was at the origin of the 
carrying capacity concept. If the carrying capacity of a given area can be calculated, the 
exploitation of resources can then be confined to set limits, which cannot be exceeded without 
endangering the mode of livelihood. The use of terms such as “overexploitation” and 
“degradation” clearly reflects the existence of tensions between development and 
environment in this view. 
Exploitationism is a type of technocentrism  which accepts “as axiomatic that the market 
mechanism in conjunction with technological innovation will ensure infinite substitution 
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possibilities to mitigate long-run real resource scarcity” (Turner 1988, p.1). Exploitationists  
have a firm belief in the functioning of the market, which will always promote substitution of 
scarce resources. In its extreme form, this view may even maintain that once clean air 
becomes scarce, help is near, because the production of clean air will become profitable. It is 
crystal clear that there is no tension between development and environment in this view. 
Conservationism rejects the possibility of infinite substitution and aims at a controlled 
resource use by policies setting resource management rules. Regulation is accepted in this 
view, although there is a preference for promoting the internalisation of externalities through 
reward. For example, thanks to a combination of enforcement and ecology tax (representing 
the costs of air pollution in the price of leaded motor fuel), cleaner motor fuel has become 
profitable and therefore available. In geography, this view has modified the carrying capacity 
approach by incorporating the notion of discrete levels of technology allowing for different 
levels of resource exploitation. 
 
Development and environment: challenging received wisdom in geography 
 
A more recent view also accepts the regulation of resource use, although it is best 
characterised by its firm belief in  “human agency”, i.e. in the capacity of people to integrate 
experience into their actions and to look for outlets for ambitions and solutions to problems. 
Because of its emphasis on the human capacity to adapt repeatedly to changing 
circumstances, Blaikie (1998) has called this view “neo-populist developmentalism”. Neo-
populism is strongly actor-oriented and pays much attention to local or indigenous 
knowledge. Participatory research is favoured and looks for local agendas to support. The 
political agenda is that of empowerment of the excluded poor through their grassroots, 
community-based or non-governmental, organisations. Sustainable exploitation of scarce 
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resources and economic growth go very well together according to this view. Man is capable 
of overcoming tensions between development and environment. Echoing Boserup (1965), 
population growth is considered to be an impetus for sustainable resource exploitation rather 
than the herald of a Malthusian apocalypse. In what follows I will discuss the origin and 
argumentation of neo-populism in the geography of development.  
 
“Challenging received wisdom” is the title of a section in a book by Leach and Mearns (1996) 
with the provocative title “The Lie of the Land”. It is also a telling characterisation of what 
has become a national sport among British geographers and other environmental scientists: 
contesting established views of resource exploitation, degradation, development policy and 
economic growth. However, they do not simply criticise, but have developed a new coherent 
argumentation against the orthodoxy, which is almost without exception characterised by an 
optimistic, postmodern faith in the capability of man to master environmental problems and to 
attain sustainable development, even in opposition to outdated state policies. The seriousness 
of environmental problems is usually not denied, but general problems, such as 
desertification, are first localised and then confronted with more positive findings from other 
locations. The resulting picture is one of relativism and optimism: man is able to improve his 
livelihood by exploiting natural resources in a sustainable way. The International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), both in 
the United Kingdom, can be considered the cradle of this neopopulist approach. Most drafts 
of papers and reports are published in the Issue Papers of IIED's Drylands Programme, the 
Haramata Bulletin and IIED's Gatekeepers Series and the Network Papers of ODIs Pastoral 
Development Network and later on, as scientific articles and books, give rise to debate. Their 
influence goes beyond the scientific world. At present there are close links between these 
institutes and some important development donors like the British Department for 
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International Development, the European Union and the Swedish International Development 
Agency.  
Leach and Mearns (1996) was by no means the first neopopulist publication, but it gives an 
excellent overview of the group's critique of preservationist, exploitationist and 
conservationist views on environmental themes, notably deforestation, desertification, 
pastoralism, population growth and intensification. Strikingly, most of their argument is 
related to the African environment. 
In the remainder of this section two debates, the first on pastoralism and rangeland ecology 
and the second on land degradation and population growth, will be examined to illustrate the 
neopopulist critique of the received wisdom on the tension between development and 
environment.  
 
Pastoralism and rangeland ecology 
  
What does responsible management and sustainable exploitation of rangeland by nomadic and 
semi-nomadic pastoralists mean? A stormy debate is raging on this question, which is rooted 
in the complexity of vegetation degradation and conflicting views on vegetation dynamics. 
For several decades, “received wisdom” has been rooted in the Clementsian theory of 
vegetation succession. This theory states that every area, given its soil and climate 
characteristics, has its own climax vegetation. If this climax vegetation is disturbed by human 
exploitation, it will return after a certain period of rest. The Clementsian assumption that a 
shifting cultivation field in the tropical forest will be completely recaptured by the forest once 
cultivation stops is well-known. The theory makes a similar assumption about rangeland, 
where grass is considered to be the climax vegetation. Environmental policy based on this 
theory expects the pastoralist to maintain an equilibrium between the grazing pressure of his 
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flock and the natural regeneration towards the climax vegetation, maintaining the equilibrium 
between grazing pressure and regeneration has become synonymous with sustainable 
rangeland exploitation. The concept of carrying capacity was operationalised as the maximum 
permissible grazing pressure. Exceeding this carrying capacity was considered to be 
overgrazing, that would result in degradation of the vegetation. Eventually the pastoralist 
would be forced to abandon the range. Regeneration would then result in the restoration of the 
climax vegetation. However, heavy overgrazing could also irrecoverably damage the 
ecosystem, thus making regeneration of the vegetation impossible. This was considered to be 
one of the main causes of desertification, producing a genuine Malthusian script. 
Two publications, Behnke et al. (1993) and Scoones (1994), provide an excellent review of 
the conflicting proposition: challenging Clementsian received wisdom. These adherents of 
“new range ecology” argue that, in regions with extreme climatic variability, the notion of 
climax vegetation is not applicable, simply because variability from one year to another can 
be so extreme that a climax vegetation can never be achieved, or rather, is imaginary. In these 
so-called “non-equilibrium environments” conditions are so variable that even average 
situations only exceptionally occur. The proposition of non-equilibrium environments is a 
rather recent variation on Prigogine's economic chaos theory.  Again, most of the arguments 
in new range ecology stem from research in African drylands, notably the Sahel, which is also 
characterised by specific, very poor, soil conditions. 
It will be clear that new range ecology takes a different view of sustainable rangeland 
exploitation by pastoralists.  From this angle, the herder cannot influence the most important 
factor determining the quality of the range, i.e. rainfall, so there is very little for him to 
regulate at all. For example, fewer cattle (reducing grazing pressure) will not guarantee 
sufficient fodder the next year, because a dry spell may then prevent grass from growing at 
all. In that case the herder would have been better off if he had fully exploited all the 
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available biomass in the first year. In new range ecology, “opportunistic range management”, 
defined by the keeping of large, productive herds as long as circumstances permit and moving 
on and selling off as quickly as possible when circumstances dictate, is perceived as the most 
sustainable method of resource use. And, of course, this is precisely what pastoralists have 
been doing all the time. In the non-equilibrium environments of the Sahel, the productivity of 
the rangeland is spatially very heterogeneous and highly variable in time, so that mobility of 
the herds is a prerequisite.  
This does not mean that pastoralists simply muddle along and manage their flocks without a 
plan. Numerous studies have emphasised their fabulous environmental knowledge. Rotation 
of pastures, weekly or monthly, have been noticed. Most pastoral groups monitor closely the 
state of their pastures and have scouts who visit distant pastures by foot or on horseback and 
who determine which pastures to go to and which to avoid or spare. Overgrazing of the range 
is not only prevented by trekking to new pastures in time, but also by increasing the 
rangeland's capacity. In the Sahel, pastoralists protect seedlings of the Acacia albida, a tree 
that carries leaves in the dry season and therefore increases the fodder capacity in a period 
considered to be the most restraining of the year. Old camp sites are protected, in order 
improve regeneration of the range, because the dung deposited stimulates plant growth, which 
turns these places into regeneration poles (Niamir 1990). 
The “new range ecologists” admit that the natural vegetation changes as a result of pastoralist 
exploitation. However, they do not consider that as degradation, any more than the cultural 
landscape of any farming system is considered to be degradation. In fact, they maintain that 
nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralism in the Sahel is the most efficient system of biomass 
exploitation for that region, with yields per hectare surpassing those of modern American or 
Australian ranches. Development programmes that have tried to improve traditional 
pastoralism by imitating this alien ranching model, including the rotation of enclosed 
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pastures, the introduction of new species of grass and improved breeds, have failed to achieve 
their production goals and are now considered to have contributed to degradation.  
Nevertheless, neo-populists do not ignore the fact that Sahelian pastoralism is under pressure. 
Encroaching crop cultivation frustrates herd mobility and reduces the area of pasture. 
Moreover, failing government and donor interventions, wars and population growth make the 
situation for Sahelian pastoralists even worse. It is therefore argued that there are no standard 
solutions and that all development policies should start from the complexity of pastoral 
livelihood strategies. Incidentally, is it a coincidence that not only are human causes of 
desertification currently being explored, but that renewed attention is also being paid to 
purely climatic determinants? At least, this trend supports the neopopulist crusade of 
absolving pastoralists from the crime of desertification.  
 
Land degradation and population growth 
 
The second debate illustrating diverging views on development and environment, is the so-
called “intensification debate”, which focuses on land degradation, conservation and 
population growth. Here, neo-exploitationists challenge a neo-Malthusian scenario of 
disastrous population growth by reviving Boserup's (1965) proposition about the 
advantageous relationship between population growth and economic development. 
The neoMalthusian “narrative” is well-known. It presupposes a certain production capacity 
for every agroecological zone and it also emphasises that tropical ecosystems are very 
vulnerable. Population growth in these circumstances would soon give rise to 
overexploitation, especially if the population was poor. Overgrazing, unlimited forest 
exploitation and short rotation cycles of bush fallow would result in soil exhaustion, 
vegetation degradation and perhaps even in desertification and climatic change. In other 
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words, the vicious circle of impoverishment was seriously argued. Proof for this argument 
was close at hand. Almost everywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa agricultural output per capita 
was declining. Drought and famine were omnipresent and soil degradation was documented. 
Resource competition was suspected behind the violence between ethnic groups, for example, 
between peasants and pastoralists. At the macro-level the agricultural crisis was, and still is, 
apparent. For a long time, the wave of micro-studies in the 1980s and ‘90s – which repeatedly 
stressed the adaptive capacities of peasants and, increasingly, of peasant women too, and 
expressed growing appreciation for their local knowledge systems - were unable to develop a 
coherent vision to combat this neo-Malthusian scenario. At last, the debate on agricultural 
intensification was given a decisive impetus by the éminences gris of the neo-Boserupian 
thesis, Mary Tiffin and Michael Mortimore. The latter had already attracted attention in the 
1970s with his research results from the Kano Close-Settled Zone in Hausaland, Northern 
Nigeria. The pair became celebrated for their “More people, less erosion” publications on the 
Machakos district in Kenya (cf. Tiffin, Mortimore and Gichuki 1994). The authors show 
photographs taken in the 1930s of seriously eroded landscapes in the then native reserve. In 
the 1990s population was almost sixfold and acreage per capita had been more than halved. 
But photographs taken at the same spots now show a prosperous countryside with terraces, 
trees, coffee and farmsteads. Yields per acre have expanded by a factor of 6 and value of 
production (in constant prices) is now 10 times as high per acre and 3 times as high per capita.  
The explanation for this success story starts with the forced construction of terraces in the 
colonial period and the introduction of ploughs by Kenyan soldiers returning from India in the 
Second World War. But the take-off in land conservation came after independence when 
forced labour disappeared, the construction of terraces was implemented by traditional 
working parties, and women started playing a leading role in the community, because of the 
migration of men to Nairobi. There is much organic fertilisation of crops - livestock that used 
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to be collectively herded are now held individually and in cowsheds - fodder is grown and 
improved dairy breeds have been introduced. Extended families have increasingly given way 
to nuclear families and the position of women has been improved. 
The authors claim that the initiative for this metamorphosis came from the population itself 
which developed its livelihood on the basis of its own needs, perception, experience and 
knowledge, profiting from the revenues of labour migration and coffee exports. In addition,  
they used knowledge, training, support in soil and water conservation and new varieties 
provided by the government and donor agencies.  The enabling role of the Kenyan 
government was especially acknowledged in the way that it facilitated the proper functioning 
of markets and land titling. 
 
It looks at first sight as if Boserup's thesis on the positive effects of population pressure has 
been given new life. But it is more that that. As Grigg (1979) showed over 20 years ago in his 
overview of studies testing Boserup’s thesis, numerous situations may occur, and indeed have 
occurred, in which population pressure has not resulted in agricultural development. The 
interesting point of the case presented by Tiffin and Mortimore, and the reason why I label it 
neo-Boserupian, is that they do not limit their explanation of successful agricultural 
intensification to population pressure, but also link it to the healthy working of labour 
migration, commercialisation and government policies. Some critics even doubt if the 
Machakos study has been able to prove the link between population growth and agricultural 
intensification at all. They argue that an ordinary coincidence may explain the success story 
or that the boom in coffee prices in the 1970s and 1980s on its own was sufficient to account 
for the agricultural investments. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is less interesting to go into this controversy, than to analyse 
why the Machakos study was so enthusiastically welcomed. There are at least three reasons 
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that come to the fore in explaining its warm reception. Firstly, it provides the perfect 
neopopulist answer to the neo-Malthusian environmental doom scenario. Secondly, it reveals 
that neopopulism, by not only stressing human agency, but also acknowledging the working 
of some kind of social capital, i.e. working parties etc, has provided itself with a way out of 
postmodern individualism. Thirdly, by partly attributing the success to government policies 
and the operation of the market, it has succeeded in combining a neo-populist proposition 
with the other, even more powerful, narrative in the present development scene, i.e. 
“neoliberalism”. Neoliberalism is the development discourse that argues for the market as an 
organising principle and for government policies geared to improve its functioning. Tiffin and 
Mortimore have succeeded in juxtaposing their study of agricultural intensification in 
Machakos in between these two popular discourses. 
 
To sum up, the popularity of  “neo-populist developmentalism” lies in its emphasis on 
adaptive strategies and their ability to enhance livelihood systems and sustainability. At the 
same time, it bears a certain bias towards actors and micro-analysis. I think the geography of 
development and environment is able to overcome these limitations of micro-analysis, by 
analysing how contextual factors, or structure, and the adaptive capabilities of actors interact, 
i.e. they are both stimulated, influenced or limited by the broader socio-cultural, economic 
and political structure and, at the same time, they reshape this structure through their actions. 
Moreover, socio-economic growth and the sustainable exploitation of natural resources can at 
present only be properly understood by taking account of globalisation. This task for the 
geography of development and the environment is discussed in the next section. 
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Globalisation: the end of geography or new directions for studies in 
development and environment? 
 
Livelihood 
 
Challenging received wisdom in geography thus opens new directions, although some will 
still feel it to be reading maps in the dark. I will try to shed light by bringing up to date the 
notion of livelihood as the geographical conceptualisation of man-land relations. 
Livelihood is the way in which people make themselves a living using their capabilities and 
assets and the livelihood of groups of actors constitutes a livelihood system. In classic French 
geography (Claval 1974), a livelihood system or “genre de vie” was a integrated set of 
livelihood strategies of a human group in a specific region, in which the interaction between 
society and natural environment played a major role. Nevertheless, the environment did not 
determine livelihood. Social reality and force of habit were of importance, too. A “genre de 
vie” was therefore to be characterised as a whole of interaction of livelihood strategies with 
the natural environment, with a clear, spatial identity: the region. “In the 19th century one 
could write about the French regions as more or less independent units, nowadays livelihood, 
even in the remotest corners of the world, experiences a multitude of influences from a 
broader national and international economic, social and political context. Moreover, the man-
natural resources perspective has broadened into an interaction with various types of 
resources .... , so that a livelihood system can no longer be regarded as a more or less closed 
regional system”. “What has remained is the view that livelihood systems are a social reality 
which, by force of habit, experience a certain inertia, so that it is sometimes hardly possible to 
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reconstruct how they came into being. Livelihood strategies are rooted in this social reality.” 
(De Haan 2000, p.18) 
In order to earn a livelihood people use their capabilities and require assets and resources. To 
use a catchword, I shall call these “vital capital ” and I distinguish in turn human capital 
(labour, skill, creativity), natural capital (resources like land, water, forests and pastures, and 
also minerals), physical capital (stocks, livestock, equipment), financial capital (money, 
loans) and social capital. Social capital is described by Carney (1999a) as consisting of the 
following core elements (1) relations of trust, reciprocity and exchange between individuals, 
(2) connectedness, networks and groups, including access to wider institutions and, (3) 
common rules, norms and sanctions mutually agreed or handed down within societies. I want 
to stress, in particular, the importance of access in the notion of social capital or what Portes 
(1995, p. 120) called “the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of 
their membership in networks or broader social structures.... social capital refers to the 
individual’s or group’s ability to mobilise resources on demand”.  
This means that “vital capital” does not necessarily have to be privately owned. Land, ponds 
and forests can also be communally owned. What counts is the access to the resource when it 
is needed. Thus it refers to the real opportunity for women to gather firewood in the forest or 
for men to use water for irrigation from the village well. According to Chambers (1995), it 
also refers to the possibility of a wife to obtain food from her husband’s granary, or the access 
by pastoralists to information about cattle prices or the opportunities for temporary wage 
labour elsewhere in the region. Blaikie et al. (1994) have further detailed the notion of an 
access profile in their “access model to maintain livelihood”. In this model, households, and 
even individual household members, have a particular access profile to resources and tangible 
assets, which depend on their rights by tradition or by law. Livelihood strategies are selected 
on the basis of this access profile. Their “access model” resembles Sen’s “entitlement 
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approach” (Sen 1981; Drèze and Sen 1989). In Sen’s analysis of famines, “endowments” refer 
to owned assets (land, plough) and personal capacities (skill) through which an “entitlement” 
to food can be exercised. “Entitlement” is the way in which access to food is obtained, for 
example, by producing it with endowments, by selling labour or cash crops to buy food or 
through gifts and loans. The value of Sen’s entitlement approach with respect to natural 
resources and environmental issues is demonstrated by IDS’ “Environmental Entitlements 
Research Team”. Leach et al. (1997, p. 9) define “environmental entitlements” as alternative 
sets of benefits derived from environmental goods and services, i.e. natural capital in my 
conceptualisation, over which people have legitimate effective command and which are 
instrumental in achieving livelihood. Entitlements enhance people’s capabilities. 
Interestingly, their contribution to the conceptualisation of the relationship between social 
capital and natural capital is not limited to the actor-related entitlements, but extends to the 
institutional  level of social capital, too. Notably, Leach et al. (1999) analyse the role of 
institutions in man-land relations. They conclude that components of the natural environment 
become endowments and entitlements to actors through the complex working of both formal 
and informal institutions. Diverse institutions thus influence the course of ecological change. 
Different people in the same area rely on different institutions to claim natural capital in order 
to earn a livelihood. In general, it is not simply one institution that explains the difference 
between success and failure. Often it is only the intertwining of different institutions that 
accounts for a successful livelihood. For example, formal or informal rights “to access trees 
for wood fuel may be of little use to generate income unless combined with kin-based claims 
on labour for wood-cutting and transport, and trading networks for effective marketing” 
(Leach et al. 1999, p. 240). 
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Sustainable livelihood 
 
What is also noteworthy for the discussion on development and environment is the recent 
coupling of livelihood with sustainability in the concept of “sustainable livelihoods”. 
Livelihood is considered to be sustainable if it meets three conditions: firstly, it should be 
adequate for the satisfaction of self-defined basic needs and, secondly, it should be proof 
against shocks and stresses. These conditions were already formulated by Chambers (1995). 
Thirdly, the environment has been brought into the equation. Attention is now drawn to the 
need to prevent the depletion of natural resources in the effort to increase prosperity. Hyden 
(1998, p. 8) even argues that ecosystems should be the point of departure for sustainable 
livelihood. Following Scoones (1998), it is sufficient to formulate as the third condition for a 
sustainable livelihood that it should not undermine the natural resource base. These three 
conditions are examined further below. 
Starting with the first condition, i.e. the satisfaction of self-defined basic needs, the problems 
reside not so much in “basic” as in “self-defined”. This involves a recognition of personal 
value systems that vary from one person to another and of social values that vary from one 
society to another. As a society’s value system attaches less importance to what a person can 
do or does and more to what he or she possesses or consumes, consumption becomes a means 
of being accepted by society. Moreover, needs increase over time. UNDP (1998, pp. 59- 60) 
notes that social standards of consumption tend to rise faster than incomes. When Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Malaysia reached the same level of income in the 1980s as in Japan in the 
1960s, car ownership was three to four times as high. What was considered a luxury 30 years 
ago is now a necessity. 
The second condition is the capacity of livelihood to provide security against shocks and 
stresses. Shocks are violent and come unexpectedly; stresses are less abrupt, but can last 
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longer. Floods and earthquakes are well-known shocks. Drought is a high-level environmental 
stress; seasonality a low-level environmental stress. Of course, it is not only the environment 
that is a source of shocks and stresses. The economy is important, too, and so are politics. 
Inflation weakens competition, devaluation not only gives rise to higher prices of imported 
goods, but may also result in the production of more export crops. Violent political conflicts 
are as devastating as the worst natural hazards.  
A breakthrough in the understanding of the differential impact of shocks on livelihood had 
already been made by Sen in the 1980s (1981; Drèze and Sen 1989). He showed that drought 
and subsequent crop failure result in famine only under certain conditions. For example, 
stocks must be insufficient; social capital must be weak, as otherwise food could be 
borrowed; there must be a lack of employment to earn money in order to buy food; markets 
must be malfunctioning, as otherwise they would attract enough food from elsewhere once 
scarcity triggered a price rise. The lessons learned since Sen are, (1) that shocks stemming 
from the social, economic and political context may be as important as shocks from the 
natural environment, and (2) it is only in combination with the limited access of actors to vital 
capital that these shocks cause famines.  
An excellent expansion and elaboration of Sen’s argument on the impact of environmental 
shocks such as floods, earthquakes and landslides, storms and biological hazards was 
produced by Blaikie et al. (1994). Criticising Sen’s initial notion of perceiving endowments 
and entitlements as static and given (Blaikie et al. 1994, p. 88), they particularly examine the 
dynamics and multi-causality of vulnerability.  The accessibility of actors to vital capital is 
conceptualised in the "access model for maintaining livelihood" (see above) and connected to 
a "pressure and release model", which analyses how disasters occur when natural hazards 
affect vulnerable people.  
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 In periods of shocks and stresses, people temporarily fall back on safety mechanisms 
or “coping strategies”, i.e. short-term responses to secure their livelihood. Coping strategies 
are specific manifestations of livelihood. Foraging for wild food and hunting, the sale of 
jewellery or cattle, migration to wetter areas or to the city, and reliance on international 
disaster relief, are all temporary responses to external shocks and stresses. Depending on the 
severity and length of these, coping strategies fade away and normal livelihood strategies are 
resumed. If shocks and stresses become permanent, as when a drought is prolonged to become 
a long-term reduction of rainfall, then temporary coping mechanisms develop into permanent 
“adaptive strategies”. Adaptive strategies lead to an adapted livelihood. Subsequently, the 
idea of adaptation is lost and the adaptive strategy is considered to be a normal livelihood 
strategy 
(CASL 1998, p.2). For example, for the Fulani, semi-nomadic pastoralists in the Sahel, 
migration to southern, wetter areas is a well-known livelihood strategy. More attention to 
crop cultivation in order to compensate for the loss of cattle is seen as a coping strategy. For 
the Fulani who stayed after the Great Sahelian Drought of the 1970s in North Benin, 
agriculture eventually became an adaptive strategy and agropastoralism a new livelihood.  
However, I think that, at present, this type of equilibrium thinking no longer offers sufficient 
explanation. Climatic change, the world market and global politics are almost constantly 
exerting shocks and stresses on livelihood. New coping and adaptive strategies will  
increasingly occur as responses to new shocks and stresses, even before stability in livelihood 
as a result of a previous adaptation has been achieved. 
 The third condition for sustainable livelihood relates to the exploitation of the natural 
resource base, i.e. to natural capital. At this point, one has to bear in mind that large donors 
like UNDP, DFID and the World Bank’s poverty reduction programme, have now embraced 
the concept of sustainable livelihood (see Ashley and Carney 1999; Carney 1999b; also 
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Amalric 1998). Consequently, a wide range of views on environment and development, from 
neo-populist to conservationist, are now represented in the discussion. It is more important to 
note that the environmental condition is causing a bias in “sustainable livelihood thinking” 
towards the locality. With the attention being paid to natural resources, locality is coming to 
occupy an important position, because natural resources are place-specific. Community-based 
natural resource management, whether in its traditional form or adapted to modern times, is 
repeatedly at the focus of the analysis. In fact, the perception of shocks and stresses is also 
dominated by a local orientation. Their origin is almost exclusively seen as extra-local and 
their impact runs through the five forms of vital capital for livelihood strategies. I think this 
notion needs to be specified and amended in two ways. Firstly, it raises the question of scale. 
For example, a drought is a phenomenon on a macro-regional scale, which is locally 
manifested in the lack of rainfall. Climatic phenomena, such as droughts, should therefore be 
considered as a macro-level of scale in natural capital. On the other hand, soil fertility should 
be regarded as belonging to the local level. The same applies to social capital. Networks, 
including access to wider institutions, and political parties form part of social capital. But 
these operate at higher levels of scale than mutual help from neighbours. Secondly, the 
direction is mainly from the macro to the local. In order to clarify my argument, I need to 
draw a parallel with the actor-structure debate at this point. “Agency” is the capacity of 
people to integrate experiences into their livelihood strategies, to realise ambitions and to 
solve problems. Human agency reshapes social conditions, because it is embodied in the 
individual, but embedded in social relations through which it becomes effective (cf. Bourdieu 
1977 and 1990; Giddens 1984; Long 1989 and 1992). Individual choices and decisions are 
embedded in values and norms and institutional structures. Structures determine human 
actions and actions change structures. Thus, agency enables livelihood to adapt and to 
develop in the long run. In the same vein, the macro-local relation does not follow a single 
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direction of impacts from the macro to the local, but should be perceived as a mutual 
interaction, permitting agency to operate also from the local to the macro. 
 
Globalisation 
 
This brings me to the last part of my argument, which is how the question of development and 
environment in geography should be understood in the era of globalisation. For some authors 
it is quite simple. They have announced the end of geography (Hettne 1997, p.90) and, with 
that, the irrelevance of the question, because globalisation will diminish the sense of 
geographical distance and cause the disappearance of borders and spatial boundaries, and 
therefore of territoriality as an organising principle of social and cultural life (cf. Waters 1995 
quoted in Dibaja 1997, p.110). But what exactly is globalisation? At first sight, there appears 
to be nothing new. What has alternatively been called “imperialism as the latest phase of 
capitalism”, “world system”, “integration into the world market” or “interdependence” all 
refers to an ongoing process of internalisation. Nevertheless, Conti and Giaccaria (1998, p.18) 
explain that the physical overcoming of geographical boundaries is still apparent in the notion 
of internationalisation, while the notion of globalisation refers to the globe as a whole place. 
Thus, if there is something new going on, a qualitatively different phase in the process of 
internationalisation, then a specific label is justified. Schuurman (1997, p.152) discerns two 
different interpretations of globalisation as a new phenomenon. The first takes globalisation to 
mean increased homogenisation and interdependence in cultural, social and economic spheres 
all over the world. For some authors, the driving forces are mainly socio-political and for 
others primarily economic, i.e. originating from production and markets. The second 
interpretation discerns a dialectical relationship between the global and the local, and is 
therefore sometimes called the “glocalisation” view (Robertson 1995). The latter recognises a 
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paired trend: increased integration and homogenisation of markets and politics together with 
increased diversity and the growing importance of regionalism and community. De Ruijter 
(1997, pp. 381-382) strikingly outlines this paired trend. He points, on the one hand, to 
technological innovations in the fields of automation, telecommunications and transport, 
resulting in a massive exchange of people, goods, services and ideas. Not only have markets 
become global, but social relations and interactions increasingly span the globe, too. Tourism, 
media, transnational marketing etc. contribute to cultural homogenisation and standardised 
life styles, sometimes called “macdonaldisation”. Developments of any kind which originally 
appear in one part of the world, are echoed in other parts. He notes that this is no longer 
considered to be a “process”, but increasingly a “property” of the global system, meaning that 
developments in one part can only be understood within the framework of the world as a 
whole. “A worldwide web of interdependencies has been spun” (De Ruijter 1997, p. 382). 
However, on the other hand, he points to growing fragmentation and cultural diversity, which 
are seen as a corollary to globalisation. This refers to the reinforcement or even reinvention of 
traditions and local identities as an answer to the fear of loss of identity through 
homogenisation. It also bears witness to divergence, shrinking social cohesion and chaos. 
 Localisation, however, should not be limited to social and cultural domains. In his 
essay on the Japanese automobile industry, Miyakawa (1998) has shown that localisation 
proved to be indispensable for enabling that industry to outclass global competition. In his 
opinion, localisation took the form of high-tech investments in already existing production 
areas of the Tokaido Megalopolis; through its connection with improvement (kaizan) 
movements; through the economies of agglomeration between automobile producers and 
subcontractors; and through the involvement of venture capital business in housing for 
workers. This did not result in just another example of agglomeration effects, but in a distinct 
production environment. Foreign automobile companies had no option but to establish 
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subsidiaries there, too. And there are more examples: one need only think of the distinctive 
position the famous Silicon Valley occupies in the world of information technology. Another 
localisation trend in the economic domain is mentioned by Schuurman (1997, p. 152) quoting 
Naisbitt (1994), who sees transnational companies deconstructing themselves into 
autonomous units, resulting in corporations which are a collection of local businesses with 
intense global coordination. 
In the political sphere, globalisation is often thought to result in the decline of the state. The 
restructuring of the welfare state accompanied by privatisation and deregulation have rolled 
back the activities of the state. Regional identities have emerged in Catalonia and Flanders 
and ethnicity is creating new substates in federal Nigeria and in the Balkans. 
Thus, globalisation dramatically changes the subjective sense of distance, which is well 
reflected in the Global Village notion. But that is not the same as the disappearance of 
territoriality as an organising principle for social life. Globalisation will have different 
consequences in different places and consequently trigger new efforts of assortment and 
distinction by spatial differentiation (Van der Wusten 1998, p. 1). I think that Conti and 
Giaccaria (1998, p. 18) succeed best in sketching the outlines of these new assortments when 
they observe that globalisation influences the perception of scales in the making of different 
actors' strategies in the sense that the perception of differences between places becomes 
fuzzier. They argue that the meaning of “local” in glocalisation “is not dissimilar to that of 
region, when understood as a theoretical construct and not simply as an entity outlined by 
physical or political-administrative confines … In brief, a local system is not simply part of 
the global system, but it is a whole in itself, endowed with its own identity … It is composed 
of actors who are aware of this identity and are capable of autonomous collective behaviour. 
Levels of analysis of global and local cannot be separable, nor can they be put in a hierarchy” 
(Conti and Giaccaria 1998, p.20).  
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 To put the argument in a nutshell: globalisation gives rise to new entities, but with less 
hierarchy and fuzzier boundaries. This means that, as far as development and the environment 
are concerned, Brookfield’s (1992) approach of sustainability as a “nested hierarchy” of 
levels of scale is decreasingly in accord with reality. In discussing the sustainability of 
agricultural production, this author argued that the soil of a field can be exploited sustainably 
only when it fits into the sustainable exploitation of the farm as a whole, because fallow and 
rotation can be micro-economically organised only at the farm level. Next, sustainable 
exploitation at the farm level should fit into that of the agroecological zone or river basin. 
Take, for example, soil and water conservation measures such as terracing or irrigation, which 
can yield sustainable effects only if organised at an extra-farm level of scale. Beyond that, 
still staying with Brookfield, environmental policy should be organised at the regional level 
and macro-economic sustainability at the state level. But, in the era of globalisation, the 
“nested hierarchy” approach is problematic. I have shown elsewhere (De Haan, 2000) that 
actors’ livelihoods are becoming increasingly multi-local, so that locations of livelihood are 
increasingly no longer connected to each other vertically by lines that converge at upper 
hierarchical levels. Instead, they are increasingly connected horizontally by direct lines which 
incidentally are also becoming increasingly longer. The result is constantly shifting regions, 
each with its own specificity of nature, pace and direction of economic, social and cultural 
change, spatial arrangements and land use (De Bruijne et al 1999, p. 42). To return to the 
Machakos case, some authors have argued that it is not representative of Africa. Because of 
its nearness to the market of Nairobi, its bimodal rainfall regime and the availability of 
uncultivated land, the region is better endowed than other parts of Africa. However, 
Machakos is representative from the globalisation-localisation perspective or, rather, 
“exemplary”. Its people’s sustainable livelihood has resulted from a specific formation: 
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population pressure; local knowledge enriched with experiences from India; profitable world 
coffee markets; multi-locality in livelihood strategies, thanks to migration; social capital of 
self-help groups; and an enabling state. The example of Machakos shows that sustainable 
livelihood and the supportable exploitation of natural resources can be properly understood 
only by introducing globalisation into the equation.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The question of development and environment tends to be viewed optimistically at present in 
geography. Our review of standpoints to this question has revealed that this is mainly due to 
the influence of neopopulist developmentalism, which has succeeded with a number of well-
documented studies - though mainly limited to Africa - in counterbalancing preservationist-
inspired doom scenarios. Although its overall value still has to be ascertained, I conclude that 
neopopulist developmentalism potentially contributes in two advantageous ways to a 
geographical conceptualisation of the tension between development and environment.  
Firstly, the notion of sustainable livelihood may breathe new life into the geographical 
discussion on livelihood, provided that it does not become entangled in an actor-cum-local 
bias as neopopulism tends to. The reader will note that I have somewhat neglected the 
influence of neoliberalism of organisations like the World Bank on sustainable livelihood 
thinking. Nevertheless, if studies on livelihood, coping and adaptation scrupulously explore 
actor-context interactions, they will come closer to reality. 
Secondly, the diffusion of non-equilibrium thinking, as in new range ecology, has a healthy 
effect on geographical conceptualisation. It not only provides more instruments for analysing 
man-land relations and thus the question of development and environment, but it also opens 
the way to 
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an unprejudiced analysis of globalisation and its effects. Globalisation induces new sets of 
geographical entities, but with less hierarchy and fuzzier boundaries. Continuously adapting 
livelihoods shape constantly shifting regions with specific man-land arrangements.  There is 
an urgent need for a neo-idiographic approach in this era of globalisation. 
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